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HUMANITARIAN LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE BIFURCATION 
OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne* 
 
Abstract 
 
This article offers a fresh examination of the distinction drawn in international humanitarian 
law (IHL) between international and non-international armed conflicts. In particular, it 
considers this issue from the under-explored perspective of the influence of international 
human rights law (IHRL). It is demonstrated how, over time, the effect of IHRL on this 
distinction in IHL has changed dramatically. Whereas traditionally IHRL encouraged the 
partial elimination of the distinction between types of armed conflict, more recently it has 
been invoked in debates in a manner that would preserve what remains of the distinction. By 
exploring this important issue, it is hoped that the present article will contribute to the 
ongoing debates regarding the future development of the law of non-international armed 
conflict. 
 
Key words:  international humanitarian law; international human rights law; non-
international armed conflict; distinction between international and non-
international armed conflict. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
International lawyers have long been preoccupied with the issue of conflict characterisation. 
Thus, Soviet presence in Afghanistan from 1979 raised questions regarding the correct 
classification of the conflicts in that country for the purposes of international law.
1
 Similarly, 
the complexities arising from the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
created great confusion over the character of the conflicts in that region.
2
 Disagreement also 
existed over the nature of the conflicts in Afghanistan (following the 2001 invasion) and Iraq 
(following the 2003 invasion), due to the regime changes that occurred in those countries.
3
 
These issues also arose when the Security Council authorised foreign intervention in Libya in 
2011.
4
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 Such questions arise because the manner in which international law regulates a conflict 
varies depending on the conflict’s character. In essence, international humanitarian law (IHL) 
bifurcates the concept of armed conflict into two legal categories, expressed in their modern 
form in common Articles 2 and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
5
 Whilst common Article 
2 states that the Conventions apply in armed conflicts ‘between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties’ (‘international armed conflicts’),6 the single common Article 3 sets out 
the entire regime applicable under the Conventions in ‘armed conflict[s] not of an 
international character’ (‘non-international armed conflicts’).7 Although marking the first 
treaty provision explicitly designed for non-international armed conflicts,8 and thus reflecting 
an important development in IHL, the brevity of common Article 3 demonstrates the 
extremely limited degree to which such conflicts have traditionally been regulated by 
international law relative to inter-State wars.9 It is on this basis that most criticisms of the 
distinction between the two categories of conflict are made, for victims of internal conflicts 
have enjoyed fewer protections under IHL than those of international conflicts.10 This is 
especially worrying, given that, in the post-1945 period, non-international armed conflicts 
have become the norm rather than the exception.11  
 Subsequent developments have gradually narrowed the distinction between 
international and non-international armed conflicts. Importantly, two Additional Protocols to 
the Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1977, the first further codifying rules applicable in 
international conflicts,12 and the second doing the same for non-international conflicts.13 
Additional Protocol II (APII), however, contains only fifteen substantive articles, compared 
with over seventy in Additional Protocol I (API). Moreover, in contrast to common Article 3, 
which applies to all non-international armed conflicts, APII applies only to non-international 
conflicts that are fought between a State and those non-State groups that, ‘under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its [the State’s] territory as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations’ and to implement the Protocol.14 In 
addition to these developments in APII, Article 1(4) API lifted ‘armed conflicts in which 
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peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist 
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination’ out of the category of non-
international conflicts and brought them under the umbrella of international armed conflicts.15  
 Finally, the law applicable in non-international armed conflicts has continued to 
develop under both conventional and customary law since the adoption of the Additional 
Protocols. Regarding conventional law, a number of weapons treaties apply equally in all 
armed conflicts (and in peacetime).16 At the level of custom, it has increasingly been argued 
that a large number of the rules designed for international armed conflicts now apply equally 
in non-international conflicts, most notably by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).17  
 These developments notwithstanding, important differences remain between the law 
applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts, and States have consistently 
expressed their desire to preserve the general distinction.18 Indeed, as a caveat to its finding 
that certain rules previously applicable only in international conflicts now apply under 
custom in non-international conflicts, the ICTY confirmed that ‘only a number of rules and 
principles governing international armed conflicts have gradually been extended to apply in 
internal conflicts’ and that ‘this extension has not taken place in the form of a full and 
mechanical transplant of those rules to internal conflicts; rather, the general essence of those 
rules, and not the detailed regulation they may contain, has become applicable to internal 
conflicts’.19 
 It is on this distinction in IHL between international and non-international armed 
conflicts that the present article focuses. In particular, it examines this issue from the 
perspective of the influence of international human rights law (IHRL). It will be 
demonstrated that the evolution of the distinction drawn in IHL between types of conflict has 
been heavily influenced by the parallel development of IHRL. As such, the approach adopted 
here differs from that in other accounts of the distinction, which tend to focus on its 
consequences for victims of non-international conflicts,
20
 or its unsuitability for practical 
application.
21
 It will be shown in this article that human rights law has had two, seemingly 
contradictory, effects on this distinction in IHL. Section 2 will demonstrate how the 
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emergence of IHRL following the Second World War contributed to the necessary foundation 
for the incorporation into treaty law of rules regulating non-international armed conflicts. In 
so doing, an important challenge will be made to conventional accounts which view the post-
war developments in IHRL and IHL as entirely separate matters.
22
 Section 2 will also 
demonstrate how the subsequent expansion of IHRL continued to influence the development 
of the law of non-international armed conflict. Importantly, these developments have 
occurred primarily by drawing on the rules previously applicable only in international armed 
conflicts, such that human rights law has encouraged the gradual elimination of the 
distinction between types of conflict in IHL. Section 3 will then show how, more recently, 
human rights law has had the opposite effect, being invoked as a basis for preserving what 
remains of the distinction. This will be demonstrated with reference to recent debates 
regarding the development of the law of non-international armed conflict, which invoke 
IHRL in a very different manner than traditionally was the case.  
 The aim of this article is to construct a narrative, tracing the development of this 
distinction in contemporary IHL by contextualising it within broader developments in 
international law. This narrative will demonstrate that a fundamental shift has occurred in the 
influence of human rights law on IHL’s distinction between categories of conflict. Moreover, 
it will show how two major topics at the heart of many current debates in the area, those 
regarding the distinction in IHL and the relationship between IHL and human rights law, are 
very closely linked. It is hoped that, by tracing and analysing these developments, a richer 
understanding of this structural feature of IHL will be offered, which can then contribute to 
the ongoing debates about the future development of the law of non-international armed 
conflict.  
 
II. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CATEGORIES OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 
 
The evolution of IHRL following the Second World War played an important role as a 
catalyst in the development of the law of non-international armed conflict. Importantly, as 
will be shown in this section, human rights law has been invoked so as to encourage the 
extension of many of the rules traditionally applicable only in international armed conflicts to 
their non-international counterparts. The consequence has been the gradual and partial 
elimination of the distinction between the two categories of conflict in IHL. To demonstrate 
this, a brief discussion of the distinction as it existed in international law before the 
consolidation of IHRL is first necessary in section A. This will provide important context for 
understanding the relevance of IHRL for the adoption of common Article 3 in 1949. Section 
B will then build upon that discussion by demonstrating how the continued evolution of 
IHRL has encouraged the subsequent development of the law of non-international armed 
conflict and narrowing of this distinction in IHL.  
 
A. The traditionally inter-State nature of international law  
 
Appreciating the origins of the distinction between international and non-international armed 
conflicts is important for understanding the influence of IHRL. Until the adoption of the four 
Geneva Conventions in 1949, the distinction arose from the fact that treaty law was generally 
concerned only with conflicts between States and did not regulate civil conflicts within a 
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State.23 Although there have long existed customary rules on the laws of war, the project of 
codifying those rules in multilateral treaties did not begin until the mid-nineteenth century.24 
At this point in history, international law was presumed to regulate only the reciprocal 
relationships between States, and treaties generally dealt only with questions relevant to this 
subject matter; intra-State issues tended to be excluded, as these were seen as belonging to 
the realm of domestic, as opposed to international law.25 Early treatises confirmed this inter-
State focus of traditional international law, with the first editions of Oppenheim containing 
the classic formulation: ‘International Law is a law between States only and exclusively’.26 
The Oppenheim formula certainly glossed over many of the nuances concerning the position 
of non-State actors within international law at the time, and one might note here as examples 
the international minimum standard on the treatment of aliens and direct access of individuals 
to international tribunals. However, as a formal description, it was for the most part accurate, 
for whilst individuals were directly engaged by international law in these areas, the principal 
relationship at issue remained inter-State.27 Thus, the international minimum standard 
concerned the treatment of foreign nationals,28 whilst individual access to international 
tribunals was generally restricted to claims against a foreign State.29 This helps to explain 
why, with the adoption of the early conventions on IHL, the question of their application to 
civil (intra-State) conflict did not arise.30 Instead, they were generally applicable only in 
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  L Oppenheim, International Law, A Treatise: Volume II, War and Neutrality (Longmans, Green & Co 
1906) 266. Similarly, see J Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (CUP 1894) 1 
(‘[i]nternational law is the body of rules prevailing between states’).    
27
  There were rare exceptions to this, for example, in the case of minority protection, which has a long 
pedigree in international law, albeit being defined differently over time: P Thornberry, International Law and 
the Rights of Minorities (OUP 1991); JE Nijman, ‘Minorities and Majorities’ in B Fassbender and A Peters 
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  See, eg, MO Hudson, ‘The Central American Court of Justice’ (1932) 26 AJIL 759, 765; E Borchard, 
‘The Access of Individuals to International Courts’ (1930) 24 AJIL 359; M Paparinskis, The International 
Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment (OUP 2013) 34–6.  
30
  Similarly, see Y Sandoz, C Swinarski and B Zimmerman (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols 
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff 1987) [4342]; E 
Crawford, ‘Unequal Before the Law: The Case for the Elimination of the Distinction between International and 
Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2007) 20 Leiden J Intl L 441, 443–4; R Bartels, ‘Timelines, Borderlines 
and Conflicts: The Historical Evolution of the Legal Divide Between International and Non-International Armed 
Conflicts’ (2009) 91 IRRC 35, 47–8; D Kretzmer, ‘Rethinking Application of IHL in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts’ (2009) 42 Isr L Rev 8, 11–13; D Akande, ‘Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal 
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situations of ‘war’,31 which did not include conflicts between States and their subjects: ‘[t]o 
be considered war, the contention must be going on between States’.32  
 The nineteenth century did, however, witness the emergence in customary international 
law of the doctrines of insurgency and belligerency that addressed, to differing degrees, civil 
war.33 The effectiveness of these doctrines, however, still remained constrained by the inter-
State focus of international law. In particular, they tended to be relevant mainly to those 
internal conflicts that affected the interests of third States, being invoked by such States to 
regulate their relations with the parties to the conflict.34 Moreover, even according to the 
doctrine of belligerency, whereby insurgents could be recognised as belligerents either by the 
State against which they were fighting (leading to the application of the ius in bello between 
them) or by a third State (leading to the application of the law of neutrality), recognition 
remained entirely at the discretion of the particular State.35 Humanitarian concerns were, 
therefore, somewhat side-lined. Indeed, recognition of belligerency fell into desuetude in the 
twentieth century, and it was the refusal by States in particularly atrocious civil wars, such as 
that in Spain, to recognise the belligerent status of their opponents, which highlighted the 
need for a more robust method by which to regulate these conflicts; the consequence was a 
renewed demand, particularly by the ICRC, for treaty rules in this area.36  
 It was, therefore, only in 1949 that non-international armed conflicts explicitly became 
subject to treaty-based regulation under common Article 3. At the same time, the distinction 
between international and non-international conflicts was codified. As the first treaty 
provision adopted to address non-international conflicts, common Article 3 was one of a 
number of developments at that time that reflected the expansion of the subject matter of 
international law to include purely intra-State matters. The other key development in this 
regard was, of course, the emergence of IHRL following the end of the Second World War, 
reflected in provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,37 the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR),
38
 and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide.
39
 Lea Brilmayer has opined that these post-war developments 
represented a shift in international law from traditional contractual notions of legal obligation 
to the rise of non-reciprocal ‘pledges’ by States to act in conformity with moral precepts.40 
                                                          
31
  See above, n 23. It is noteworthy that a few of the earliest IHL treaties were silent with regard to their 
scope of application, and certain authorities used this as a basis for arguing that they applied equally in internal 
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  RA Falk, ‘Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War’ in JN Rosenau (ed), International 
Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton University Press 1964) 208. See also AP Higgins (ed), Hall’s Treatise on 
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 edn, Clarendon Press 1924) 39. 
35
  There was some disagreement as to whether States were bound to recognise belligerency, although a 
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Hall, A Treatise on International Law (3
rd
 edn, Clarendon Press 1890) 34; H Lauterpacht, Recognition in 
International Law (CUP 1947) 246. 
36
  Moir (n 8) 19–21. 
37
  Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, 
entered into force 24 October 1945) 892 UNTS 119, art 1(3). 
38
  UNGA Res 217 A(III) (10 December 1948). Although non-binding, the UDHR had important ‘moral 
authority’: H Lauterpacht, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (1948) 25 BYIL 354, 370–5. 
39
  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, 
entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277.  
40
  L Brilmayer, ‘From “Contract” to “Pledge”: The Structure of International Human Rights Agreements’ 
(2007) 77 BYIL 163. Others have similarly noted the non-traditional structure of human rights obligations: GG 
Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951–4: Treaty Interpretation and 
Other Treaty Points’ (1957) 33 BYIL 203, 277; B Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in 
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Importantly, these ‘pledges’ were intra-State in the strictest sense, in that the obligations 
thereunder rested on States vis-à-vis their own nationals (and, of course, non-nationals within 
their jurisdiction). The novelty therefore laid in the absence of any necessary inter-State 
element, in contrast to those previous developments in international law noted above that 
directly engaged individuals, such as the minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
41
  
 We might think of these developments in the aftermath of the Second World War as the 
consolidation of intra-State structures of obligation in international law. By this is meant the 
general extension of the subject matter of international law to include purely intra-State 
matters. As seen from the references above to Oppenheim and other early texts, such intra-
State structures of obligation were generally absent from classical international law, 
accounting, in large part, for the lack of treaty rules on non-international armed conflicts. The 
adoption of common Article 3 in 1949 must, therefore, be seen as part of this broader trend in 
international law, with the emergence of intra-State obligations contributing to the necessary 
foundations for the adoption of a treaty provision on non-international armed conflicts. The 
premise underpinning both IHRL and the law of non-international armed conflict is, after all, 
that it is the relationship between a State and its nationals that is to be regulated.
42
 Indeed, 
Theodor Meron has highlighted this close relationship between the post-war emergence of 
human rights law and the adoption of common Article 3: 
 
This Article [common Article 3] is a clear demonstration of the influence of 
human rights law on humanitarian law. The inclusion in the United Nations 
Charter of the promotion of human rights as a basic purpose of the Organization, 
the recognition of crimes against humanity as international crimes, the conclusion 
of the 1948 Genocide Convention and the regulation by a multilateral treaty of 
non-international armed conflicts for the first time in 1949, all stemmed from this 
influence.
43
  
 
The novelty of these broader developments, however, meant that common Article 3 would 
prove the most contentious article during the 1949 diplomatic conference.
44
 Importantly, 
many of the debates on what would become common Article 3 were concerned not so much 
with extending humanitarian law to internal conflicts but rather, more generally, with 
extending international law to intra-State matters. This is evidenced by the records of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
International Law’ (1994) 250 Recueil des Cours 217, 242–3; J Crawford, ‘Multilateral Rights and Obligations 
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42
  H Krieger, ‘A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 
in the ICRC Customary Law Study’ (2006) 11 JCSL 265, 275; Kretzmer (n 30) 9. Admittedly, the growth of the 
category of ‘non-international armed conflict’ has seen a number of examples that do not fit this model, such as 
those involving two more non-State armed groups, with no central government involvement: see Pejić (n 7). 
43
  T Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 7 (footnotes omitted). Whilst 
Meron also refers to the prosecution of crimes against humanity, at the time these could only be prosecuted 
where linked to an inter-State conflict: E Schwelb, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ (1946) 23 BYIL 178, 207; A 
Cassese, International Criminal Law (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2008) 104.  
44
  B de Schutter and C Van Der Wyngaert, ‘Coping with Non-International Armed Conflicts: The 
Borderline Between National and International Law’ (1983) 13 Ga J Intl & Comp L 279, 284 (noting that 
common art 3 was the most debated provision at the conference). 
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comments of the delegation of Burma, unofficial representative of the Asian bloc,
45
 which 
objected to the inclusion of any provision relating to non-international armed conflicts.
46
 A 
central concern of the Burmese delegate was that ‘[i]nternal matters cannot be ruled by 
international law or Conventions … It is not the object of the Conference to intervene in 
matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.’47 Such objections did not 
prevail, however, largely because they ignored the contemporaneous developments noted 
above. Indeed, in response to similar objections by the UK,
48
 the Soviet delegate made clear 
the importance of recent innovations in laying the foundation for the adoption of common 
Article 3: 
 
This theory [that international law does not regulate internal matters] was not 
convincing, since although the jurists themselves were divided in opinion on this 
point, some were of the view that civil war was regulated by international law. 
Since the creation of the Organization of the United Nations, this question seemed 
settled. Article 2 of the Charter provided that Member States must ensure peace 
and world security. They could therefore not be indifferent to the cessation of 
hostilities, no matter the character or localization of the conflict. Colonial and 
civil wars therefore came within the purview of international law.
49
 
 
The post-war consolidation of intra-State structures of obligation thus played an important 
role in the adoption of common Article 3. In this sense, although it is true that, generally, 
there was no cross-fertilisation between IHL and IHRL at this time,
50
 there was an important 
structural relationship between IHRL and the law of non-international armed conflict.
51
 As 
reflected in the quote above by Meron, these post-war developments in IHL and IHRL were 
not merely coincidental but intimately connected. The extension of international law to 
purely intra-State matters rendered anachronistic the historical basis for differentiating 
between international and non-international conflicts.  
 Importantly for the present thesis, common Article 3 was based on the proposed (but 
eventually unsuccessful) preamble to the Geneva Conventions.
52
 The new treaty law of non-
international armed conflict was, therefore, modelled on the law applicable in international 
armed conflicts, with the result that, whilst codifying the distinction, the Geneva Conventions 
partially narrowed it. Indeed, this provenance of common Article 3 helps to explain why it 
lays down only the most basic and open-ended norms. Of course, the uniqueness of these 
broader developments in international law meant that any provision regarding internal 
                                                          
45
  DA Elder, ‘The Historical Background of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949’ (1979) 
11 Case W Res J Intl L 37, 50 (referring to Burma as the ‘self-styled Asian representative’ at the 1949 
diplomatic conference). 
46
  The main objections of Burma to what became common art 3 can be found in Final Record of the 
Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949: Volume II, Section B (ICRC 1963) at 327–30. 
47
  Ibid, 330.  
48
  Ibid, 10. 
49
  Ibid, 14. 
50
  Kolb (n 22). 
51
  Similarly, see Kretzer (n 30) 9. 
52
  JS Pictet (ed), Commentary to Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (ICRC 1952) 23. A brief look at some of the proposals for the 
preambles reveals their similarity to common art 3: see, eg, Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of 
Geneva of 1949: Volume II, Section A (ICRC 1963) 366 (Soviet Union); Final Record of the Diplomatic 
Conference of Geneva of 1949: Volume I (ICRC 1963) 113 (Stockholm draft). 
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conflicts was necessarily going to be very limited, as many States were concerned as to the 
consequence that legislating for such conflicts would have on their sovereignty.
53
  
 Following these initial developments in the wake of the Second World War, the 
subsequent evolution of IHRL has continued to encourage the parallel development of the 
law applicable in non-international armed conflicts. As with the adoption of common Article 
3, the consequence of these developments has been a further reduction in the distinction 
drawn by IHL between types of armed conflict. It is to this that we now turn in the following 
section. 
 
B. The expansion of the law of non-international armed conflict 
 
In the decades following the adoption of the first international human rights instruments in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, IHRL developed considerably, marked by the 
widespread ratification of international and regional human rights treaties.
54
 This rapid 
evolution of IHRL in turn both represents and has encouraged the continued expansion of 
international law from its historically inter-State domain, with the result that it now concerns 
itself more than ever with intra-State matters and, more specifically, the protection of the 
individual. As the International Law Association’s Committee on International Human Rights 
Law and Practice has stated, ‘[t]he permeation of international human rights law through 
general international law constitutes a quiet revolution which invariably targets international 
law’s most “statist” features’.55 More specifically, individual protection, without regard to 
any necessary inter-State element, now forms a major substantive area of international legal 
regulation. Whilst a number of scholars have cautioned against overstating the implications 
of this trend, its existence is undeniable.
56
 Indeed, one can see this impact of IHRL in many 
diverse areas, from the methodological approach to the formation of custom,
57
 to the debates 
regarding the need to introduce human rights considerations into the structure of the 
                                                          
53
  See, eg, Final Record: Vol II-B (n 46) 10 (UK) and 98–9 (France). Sovereignty concerns would continue 
to be expressed in subsequent conferences: Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation 
and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–7): Volume 
VIII (Federal Political Department 1978) 205 (Argentina); ibid, 206 (German Democratic Republic); Official 
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Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–7): Volume VII (Federal Political Department 1978) 81 
(India). 
54
  See, eg, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).  
55
  MT Kamminga and M Scheinin, The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (OUP 
2009) 22.  
56
  Such scholars are extremely varied in their focus and the reasons for their caution: see, eg, A Pellet, 
‘“Human Rightism” and International Law’ (2000) 10 Italian Ybk Intl L 3 (doubting that the human rights 
movement has fundamentally altered the State-centrism of international law); S Marks, The Riddle of All 
Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology (OUP 2000) (critiquing the 
emancipatory promise of the so-called ‘democratic norm thesis’ and the marginalisation of socio-economic 
rights); A Orakhelashvili, ‘The Position of the Individual in International Law’ (2000) 31 Cal W Intl LJ 241 
(arguing that the emergence of rights and obligations of individuals in international law has not elevated them to 
the position of international legal persons). 
57
  See, eg, FL Kirgis, ‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’ (1987) 81 AJIL 146; T Meron, ‘The Geneva 
Conventions as Customary Law’ (1987) 81 AJIL 361; Kamminga and Scheinin (n 55) 7–8 and ch 6; Prosecutor 
v Kupreškić (Trial Judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) [527] and [531] (suggesting that custom can form 
with scant practice where demanded by principles of humanity). 
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international trading system.
58
 Theodor Meron has referred to this trend as the ‘humanization 
of public international law’.59  
 This evolution of IHRL has also continued to have an important impact on IHL and, 
importantly for our purposes, the evolution of the law of non-international armed conflict, 
following the important step made in 1949. This influence is illustrated clearly in two 
particular developments: first, the adoption of the Additional Protocols in 1977, and, second, 
the development of customary law by the ICTY. On the first, IHRL played an important role 
at the 1974–7 diplomatic conference at which the Protocols were negotiated. Indeed, the 
work of the UN in the late 1960s on human rights in armed conflict
60
 can be seen as a prelude 
to the diplomatic conference.
61
 More specifically, the influence of IHRL on that process is 
illustrated in several ways. First, the provision noted above in Article 1(4) API, regarding 
wars of national liberation, was heavily influenced by recent developments that had occurred 
in IHRL and State practice. Thus, during the 1960s and early 1970s, as a result of the 
decolonisation process, self-determination consolidated into an independent human right.
62
 
This fact, together with the representation at the 1974–7 conference of many newly-
independent States and national liberation movements,
63
 led to the elimination of the 
distinction for a very specific category of non-international armed conflicts, i.e. those 
involving anti-colonial or national liberation struggles.
64
  
 Second, and most importantly for present purposes, just as the post-war consolidation 
of intra-State structures of obligation was relied upon by certain States advocating the 
adoption of common Article 3, so the continued expansion of IHRL was invoked by a 
number of delegates at the 1974–7 diplomatic conference as evidence of the increasing role 
played by international law in protecting individuals vis-à-vis their own State. This served to 
highlight not only that the historical basis for the marginalisation of non-international armed 
conflicts was being constantly eroded but that this marginalisation was also inconsistent with 
the emphasis on individual protection that was becoming so ubiquitous in international law. 
This line of argument was employed by a number of delegates at the 1974–7 diplomatic 
conference. For example, during the drafting of APII, the delegate for the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) argued: 
 
… there had been considerable developments in international law since the 
drafting of the [UN] Charter and the legal position of the individual had also 
changed. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights had been adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948, but it was only 
now becoming clear that the individual had a part to play as a subject of the new 
legal order … One result of that development had been a change in the definition 
                                                          
58
  Compare, eg, EU Petersmann, ‘The WTO Constitution and Human Rights’ (2000) 3 J Intl Econ Law 19 
and P Alston, ‘Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann’ 
(2002) 13 EJIL 815. 
59
  Meron (n 43) xv.  
60
  See, eg, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc A/Conf.32/41, 22 April–13 
May 1968; UNGA Res 2444 (XXIII), ‘Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ (19 December 1968). 
61
  Sivakumaran (n 4) 44–6 (noting this contribution of the UN).  
62
  ICCPR (n 54) art 1(1); R Higgins, Problems & Process: International Law and How We Use It (OUP 
1994) 114–5. 
63
  Sandoz (n 30) xxxiii; Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–7): Volume I 
(Federal Political Department 1978) 7 (the ‘progressive development and codification of international 
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts is a universal task in which the national liberation movements 
can contribute positively’); C Ewumbue-Monono, ‘Respect for International Humanitarian Law by Armed Non-
State Actors in Africa’ (2006) 88 IRRC 905, 917–8. 
64
  API (n 12) art 1(4). 
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of State sovereignty in international relations. One of the most important 
limitations on State sovereignty was respect for human rights.
65
  
 
By invoking IHRL in this manner, as evidence of the extension of international law to intra-
State matters for the purpose of protecting individuals, norms of IHL were then free to move 
across into non-international armed conflicts and, in so doing, the distinction could be 
narrowed. Consequently, as with common Article 3, the majority of the provisions of APII 
were based on the law applicable in international armed conflicts.
66
 Indeed, this was treated 
as the self-evident means by which to humanise non-international conflicts.
67
 There were 
exceptions to this, whereby specific rights contained in human rights treaties were drawn on 
directly in drafting particular provisions in APII.
68
 However, where this was the case, it was 
done so either for both international and non-international armed conflicts or simply to 
address a situation unique to non-international conflicts. Importantly, IHRL was not invoked 
as an alternative to drawing from the rules applicable in international conflicts.
69
  
 The same influence of IHRL can also be seen in the developments that have occurred in 
customary international law. Much of this development was recognised, and driven, by the 
ICTY.
70
 The Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, for example, invoked IHRL in 
precisely the same manner as the delegate of the FRG at the 1974–7 conference, holding that 
a number of rules applicable as treaty law only in international conflicts now apply equally, 
under custom, in non-international armed conflicts. It is worth quoting the judgment at 
length: 
 
The impetuous development and propagation in the international community of 
human rights doctrines, particularly after the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, has brought about significant changes in 
international law … A State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually 
supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach … It follows that in the area of 
armed conflict the distinction between inter-State wars and civil wars is losing its 
value as far as human beings are concerned. Why protect civilians from 
belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, 
churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe weapons causing 
unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet 
refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed 
violence has erupted “only” within the territory of a sovereign State?71 
 
Again, the evolution of IHRL was invoked as evidence that the historical basis for the 
distinction between types of conflict had fallen away, allowing for humanitarian concerns to 
become decisive.
72
 On this basis, the Appeals Chamber concluded that a number of rules of 
                                                          
65
  Official Records: Vol VIII (n 53) 220 [29]–[30]. Similarly, see ibid, 223 [46] (Italy); ibid, 218 [18]–[19] 
(New Zealand); ibid, 222 [40] (Netherlands); ibid, 230 [10] (Argentina). 
66
  See, eg, Sandoz (n 30) 1369 [4516], 1385 [4565], 1448 [4761] (noting the provenance of arts 4(1), 5 and 
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67
  Sivakumaran (n 4) 64. 
68
  See, eg, Sandoz (n 30) 1376 [4541] (on art 4(2)(f) APII prohibiting slavery and the slave trade). 
69
  This is in contrast to the approach adopted by some in modern debates, discussed below under Section 
III. 
70
  R Cryer, ‘Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel: The Influence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study’ (2006) 11 JCSL 239, 240; GH Aldrich, ‘The Laws of War on 
Land’ (2000) 94 AJIL 42, 61.  
71
  Tadić (n 17) [97]. Similarly, see Meron (n 43) 4. 
72
  See also Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Appeals Judgment) IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) [172]. 
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IHL, such as those relating to the means and methods of warfare, had crystallised as custom 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts.
73
 Once again, therefore, it has been the 
consistent approach of the ICTY to look to the law of international armed conflict when 
examining the customary rules applicable in non-international conflicts.  
   
C. Conclusions  
 
To sum up the discussion thus far, the above sections have demonstrated the important role 
played by IHRL in encouraging the development of the law of non-international armed 
conflict and the latter’s resulting convergence with the law applicable in international armed 
conflicts. Initially, the emergence of IHRL in the aftermath of the Second World War 
represented the consolidation of intra-State structures of obligation in international law, 
contributing to the necessary foundations for the adoption of common Article 3. Thereafter, 
the rapid evolution of IHRL and its emphasis on individual protection vis-à-vis one’s own 
State was relied upon in support of subsequent developments in the law of non-international 
armed conflict. Importantly, as a result of the way in which IHRL was invoked, these 
developments have generally drawn on the law applicable in international armed conflicts. 
The consequence is that IHRL has encouraged the gradual and partial elimination of the 
distinction in IHL between categories of armed conflict. Indeed, there are few areas in the 
law of non-international armed conflict that remain untouched by this gradual erosion.
74
  
 More recently, however, IHRL has had the opposite effect, in certain instances 
encouraging the preservation of what remains of the distinction between international and 
non-international armed conflicts. It is to this that we now turn in the following section.   
 
III. THE PRESERVATION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CATEGORIES OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 
 
In order to complete the picture of the impact of IHRL on IHL’s distinction between the two 
categories of armed conflict, it is necessary to consider recent debates concerning the further 
development of the law of non-international armed conflict. It will be shown in this section 
how these debates have been heavily influenced by IHRL, with consequences for the general 
distinction and its preservation. In particular, IHRL has contributed to the emergence of two 
opposing schools of thought on the development of the law of non-international armed 
conflict. I term these schools the ‘human rights approach’ and the ‘humanitarian law 
approach’, so as to reflect their differing views on the appropriate source of rules for non-
international armed conflicts (these are, in many ways, the two extremes at either end of a 
spectrum). It is important to note that it is not the goal of this section to consider the relative 
merits of these approaches or to argue whether one or the other might be a more appropriate 
avenue for the law to follow. Instead, the focus is on the impact that each of these approaches 
would have on the distinction between international and non-international conflicts in IHL. It 
will be shown that neither seeks entirely to eliminate this distinction; on the contrary, each 
relies, for very different reasons, on its preservation, marking a significant change from the 
traditional influence of IHRL that was explored in the previous section. These two schools of 
thought will now be discussed in turn. 
                                                          
73
  Tadić (n 17) [127].  
74
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A. The human rights approach 
It was noted at the outset that one of the major criticisms of the distinction between 
international and non-international armed conflicts has been its inconsistency with the 
humanitarian premise of IHL: by focusing on international conflicts and marginalising non-
international conflicts, IHL has failed sufficiently to protect victims of the latter. As was 
demonstrated in the previous section, the solution to this problem that traditionally has been 
adopted both in State practice and jurisprudence is gradually to eliminate the distinction 
between types of conflict by extending the rules applicable in international conflicts to non-
international conflicts. Indeed, those States that have sought to negotiate the highest level of 
protection for victims of internal conflicts have advocated the extension of most, if not all, of 
the rules of IHL.
75
 This has similarly been the approach advanced by a number of 
commentators.
76
 It was shown that an important driver in these developments was the parallel 
emergence and consolidation of human rights protections at the international level.  
 This section will now demonstrate that some recent approaches to the development of 
the law of non-international armed conflict invoke IHRL in a very different manner than 
traditionally was the case, with the consequence that what remains of IHL’s distinction 
between categories of conflict would be preserved. It was shown above that during the 1949 
and 1974–7 diplomatic conferences, for example, IHRL was invoked as evidence of the 
consolidation of intra-State structures of obligation in international law and the importance of 
individual protection vis-à-vis one’s own State. This meant that the historical basis for the 
distinction in IHL could fall away. Certain of the rules previously applicable only in 
international armed conflicts could then be extended to their non-international counterparts. 
The manner in which IHRL is invoked in the approaches explored in this section, however, 
differs significantly from this traditional technique. Here, IHRL is drawn on not as an 
analogy, justifying the extension of the rules applicable in international armed conflicts, but 
rather as a source of rules in itself. Thus, certain international bodies and commentators have 
drawn on IHRL directly to regulate non-international armed conflicts rather than extending 
the entire corpus of IHL, achieving the goal of protecting victims in such conflicts whilst 
maintaining the general distinction under humanitarian law. As such, IHRL is now being 
invoked in a way that would preserve what remains of IHL’s distinction, in contrast to the 
orthodoxy discussed in the previous section. It must be borne in mind that the approaches 
explored here are relevant to the law of non-international armed conflict both de lege lata and 
de lege ferenda; this will be demonstrated throughout. 
 These human rights approaches to the law of non-international armed conflict can be 
seen particularly clearly in certain practice regarding detention de lege lata. This was the 
case, for example, in the ICRC’s 2005 Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law. 
Generally, the Study drew on the law of international armed conflict in elaborating the 
customary rules applicable in non-international conflicts, consistent with the approach 
explored above.
77
 However, this was not true in all cases, and in certain areas it drew instead 
on IHRL, leading to different standards applying depending on the character of a given 
conflict. This was seen, for example, in its Rule 99, which declared that ‘[a]rbitrary 
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  See, eg, Final Record: Vol II-B (n 46) 326 (Soviet Union); Final Record: Vol I (n 52) 47 (ICRC); 
Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–1977): Volume V (Federal Political 
Department 1978) 91 (Norway); Official Records: Vol VII (n 53) 321–2 (Holy See). 
76
  See, eg, Crawford (n 9); Mastorodimos (n 20).  
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deprivation of liberty is prohibited’ under custom in both international and non-international 
conflicts.
78
 In elaborating this rule for international armed conflicts, the ICRC referred, inter 
alia, to the IHL treaty rules in the Fourth Geneva Convention,
79
 which permit a belligerent 
power to intern enemy civilians where necessary for reasons of security, subject to the 
provision of initial and periodic administrative reviews.
80
 The treaty law of non-international 
armed conflict, however, is silent on the regulation of detention. As a result, in such 
situations, rather than drawing by analogy from the rules for international armed conflicts 
found in the Fourth Geneva Convention, the ICRC relied on the more protective IHRL 
standards alone, concluding, inter alia, that internees in non-international conflicts must be 
able to challenge the legality of their internment before a court,
81
 a right protected under 
IHRL but not IHL.
82
 The result is that the rules applicable in international and non-
international conflicts remain different, with different bodies of law regulating each situation.  
 The same, differentiated approach to the regulation of detention can be seen in the 
jurisprudence of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. In Al-Jedda v 
UK, the Court examined the legality of Al-Jedda’s detention by the UK during the non-
international armed conflict phase of coalition operations in Iraq.
83
 The Court rejected the 
UK’s arguments that relevant Security Council Resolutions authorising internment in similar 
situations to those found in the Fourth Geneva Convention for international armed conflicts 
prevailed over Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
84
 
Consequently, the Court concluded that Article 5 ECHR alone applied as the relevant legal 
framework for regulating the UK’s detention operations. This is to be contrasted with the 
Grand Chamber’s subsequent approach in Hassan v UK, which again concerned a detention 
by the UK in Iraq, but during the international armed conflict phase.
85
 Here, the Court held 
that the primary legal framework against which the UK’s detention operations in such 
situations are to be judged is IHL, with its more permissive grounds for detention and review 
procedures being read into Article 5 ECHR as a matter of treaty interpretation.
86
 The 
consequence, like that of Rule 99 in the ICRC’s Study, is that whilst detention in 
international armed conflicts is subject in the first place to IHL, detention in non-international 
armed conflicts, in the absence of relevant IHL treaty rules, remains regulated solely by 
IHRL, leaving the distinction between the two categories of armed conflict intact.
87
   
 This approach of the ICRC and the European Court of Human Rights relates to the lex 
lata of non-international armed conflicts.
88
 That is to say, they are applying IHRL on the 
basis that those rules, in their view, reflect the sole standards against which the particular 
State conduct must be judged in such situations, given the silence of IHL in this area.
89
 This 
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reliance on IHRL over IHL, however, also arises de lege ferenda, and it is argued by certain 
commentators that the law of non-international armed conflict should continue to be based on 
IHRL as opposed to drawing by analogy from the law of international armed conflict. Louise 
Doswald-Beck, for example, takes the view that, with regard to the use of force against 
members of non-State armed groups, the standards of IHRL can be more appropriate for 
situations of non-international armed conflict than simply analogising to the rules on 
targeting in international armed conflicts.
90
 David Kretzmer follows a different line of 
reasoning, arguing for a gradated approach to the regulation of non-international armed 
conflicts, with IHRL alone regulating those up to the applicability threshold of APII,
91
 whilst 
the entire corpus of IHL would then apply to those that meet or surpass that threshold.
92
 What 
unites these different approaches is their use of IHRL as a direct source of rules for (at least 
some) non-international armed conflicts, rather than simply proposing the extension of the 
entire corpus of IHL to all such conflicts. The consequence is to provide for different 
standards depending on the character of the conflict: in international armed conflicts, the 
detailed rules of IHL operate, on one view, as the lex specialis and provide the primary 
standards against which conduct is to be judged;
93
 in non-international armed conflicts, on the 
other hand, these approaches envisage the application of IHRL as the governing standards, at 
least for lower intensity non-international conflicts. Whereas the previous section 
demonstrated that, traditionally, IHRL had been invoked so as to encourage the dissolution of 
the distinction between categories of conflict in IHL, the approaches explored here invoke 
IHRL as the direct source of rules, in a manner that would partially preserve what remains of 
the distinction.
94
 
 Whether these approaches are more appropriate for the purposes of developing the law 
than extending the whole corpus of IHL to non-international armed conflicts is beyond the 
scope of this article. Instead, what is relevant for present purposes is why some now rely on 
IHRL rather than IHL in proposing how the law applicable to non-international conflicts 
should develop. The answer lies in the relative protective capacities of the two bodies of 
law.
95
 Thus, in most areas, IHRL, as it has come to be developed in jurisprudence, provides 
greater protections to individuals than IHL.
96
 This is, in part, a result of the differing premises 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
under International Law (3
rd
 edn, OUP 2009) 489–91; LM Olson, ‘Practical Challenges of Implementing the 
Complementarity between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law—Demonstrated by the 
Procedural Regulation of Internment in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2009) 40 Case W Res J Intl L 437, 
454; L Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism (OUP 2012) 277–9. 
90
  L Doswald-Beck, ‘The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does International Humanitarian Law Provide 
All the Answers?’ (2006) 88 IRRC 881, 889–91 and 903–4. For a similar argument regarding targeting, see W 
Abresch, ‘A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in 
Chechnya’ (2005) 16 EJIL 741.  
91
  On this see above, text to n 14. 
92
  Kretzmer (n 30). Similarly, with regard to the regulation of the use of force in non-international armed 
conflict, see C Garraway, ‘“To Kill or Not to Kill?”—Dilemmas on the Use of Force’ (2010) 14 JCSL 499, 
509–10. 
93
  On the use of the lex specialis principle by the ICJ in defining the relationship between IHL and IHRL, 
see below at text to nn 112–13.  
94
  One might alternatively view some of these approaches, notably Kretzmer’s and Garraway’s, as 
eliminating the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts whilst at the same time 
raising the threshold for a non-international armed conflict to come into existence, leaving IHRL as the 
governing regime in a number of situations that currently would constitute non-international armed conflicts. It 
should also be noted that others have taken a human rights approach to the regulation of all armed conflicts, 
resulting in more protective, unified rules: see, eg, FF Martin, ‘Using International Human Rights Law for 
Establishing a Unified Use of Force Rule in the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2001) 64 Sask L Rev 347. 
95
  This is noted by Kretzmer (n 30) 24–6 
96
  T Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 AJIL 239, 240. See the example below 
regarding targeting at text to nn 104–08.  
16 
 
of the two bodies of law. IHRL was conceived as a body of rules to govern ‘normal’ 
peacetime situations; its primary function is the protection of the individual vis-à-vis the 
State, and it was envisaged as having general applicability.
97
 IHL, on the other hand, was 
developed to regulate a very specific situation, and its rules were consequently subject to 
different considerations than those of IHRL.
98
 In particular, it is often said that the rules of 
IHL represent a balance between humanitarian considerations and considerations of military 
necessity,
99
 a balance not reflected in IHRL.
100
 IHL thus has a permissive element to it, and 
although IHRL treaties also contain certain permissive aspects,
101
 the unique character of 
military necessity in IHL, together with the fact that IHRL has had the benefit of 
development through international jurisprudence, has meant that this permissive feature is 
much more prevalent in IHL than it is in IHRL. Indeed, certain scholars have argued that this 
permissive aspect of IHL reveals its true nature. Chris Jochnick and Roger Normand, for 
example, argue that, whilst humanitarian sentiments were the initial triggers for each 
successive codification of the laws of war,  
 
… the diplomats who negotiated the laws and the soldiers who implemented them 
structured a permissive legal regime. Despite the humanitarian rhetoric, military 
concerns have dictated the substantive content of the laws of war. National 
governments, conceiving their sovereign interests narrowly, have proven 
unwilling to accept any restrictions, legal or otherwise, on their ability to deploy 
the level of military power they deem necessary to uphold national security.
102
 
 
The permissive nature of IHL relative to IHRL was alluded to above with regard to the 
different approaches under each legal regime concerning the regulation of detention.
103
 It 
may also be illustrated by comparing the rules on the use of lethal force. Thus, it is generally 
accepted that IHL permits the lethal targeting of those qualifying as combatants at any time 
on the basis of that status alone, without the requirement that it actually be necessary in the 
prevailing circumstances, e.g. for self-defence.
104
 This lack of immunity of combatants from 
targeting is premised on the presumed threat that is posed by the group, ‘whether or not he or 
she personally endangers the lives or interests of the other party to the conflict.’105 Indeed, 
when the ICRC argued in its 2009 Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in 
Hostilities that the force used against otherwise legitimate targets (including combatants) 
‘must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the 
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prevailing circumstances’,106 this was heavily criticised by many commentators for its alleged 
failure accurately to reflect the current lex lata.
107
 This liberal approach to targeting under 
IHL contrasts starkly with the equivalent rules in IHRL as they have been developed in 
jurisprudence. There, it is required that the use of lethal force only be employed where it is 
necessary in the prevailing circumstances for the achievement of a legitimate aim, such as in 
self-defence, and where proportionate to that aim.
108
 Thus, unlike IHL, under IHRL nobody 
may be targeted solely on the grounds of status. 
 IHRL, as developed in case law, thus offers a generally more protective regime than 
IHL. It is for this reason that there is a preference by some scholars to rely, at least in part, on 
IHRL as a direct source of rules for developing the law of non-international armed conflict.
109
 
In addition, the evolution of IHRL has also fundamentally changed the consequences of 
eliminating the distinction in IHL between international and non-international conflicts. As 
David Kretzmer demonstrates when justifying his proposals for developing the law of non-
international armed conflict, whereas historically the assumption was that, absent regulation 
by IHL, States would entirely be free in the means and methods used to counter an 
insurgency on their territory, the emergence of IHRL has now changed this.
110
 Although this 
has been a topic of some dispute in the past, it is now trite to note the mainstream view that 
IHRL, absent derogation, continues to apply in armed conflict, including non-international 
conflicts.
111
 Were the distinction between international and non-international conflicts 
eliminated, the entirety of IHL would then apply alongside IHRL in non-international 
conflicts, raising the question of how the two bodies of law would interact. The International 
Court of Justice in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion interpreted this relationship for the 
purposes of the right to life using the lex specialis maxim, whereby the ‘open’ standards of 
IHRL are interpreted according to the specialised rules of IHL: 
 
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life … falls to be determined by the 
applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is 
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of 
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life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an 
arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant [on Civil and 
Political Rights], can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed 
conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.
112
 
 
The consequence of the ICJ’s lex specialis approach to the relationship between IHL and 
IHRL is that, whilst IHRL continues to apply in armed conflict, one enjoys no more 
substantive protection than otherwise exists under IHL.
113
 As noted above, the rules relating 
to targeting in IHL are much more permissive than those in IHRL, especially in light of the 
latter’s elaboration through jurisprudence. By virtue of the ICJ’s approach, therefore, 
extending the detailed IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities to non-international conflicts 
could be invoked as a justification for significantly curtailing the protections already afforded 
by the applicable rules of IHRL.
114
 Consequently, the long-held view that eliminating the 
distinction in IHL would improve the protections afforded to victims of non-international 
conflicts now faces a powerful counterargument, summed up well by Kretzmer:  
 
While the original intention behind extension of IHL to non-international armed 
conflicts was to enhance the protection granted to potential victims of such 
conflicts, given the dramatic development of IHRL, categorization of a situation 
as one of armed conflict [to which IHL would then become applicable] … may 
serve to weaken the protection offered to potential victims rather than to 
strengthen it.
115
 
 
Whilst many have raised cogent arguments against such inferences being drawn from the 
Court’s use of the lex specialis maxim,116 it is clear that others endorse the notion of IHL as 
effectively displacing otherwise applicable IHRL.
117
 Indeed, certain commentators are of the 
view that, by virtue of the extension under custom of many of the rules of IHL to non-
international armed conflicts, they already operate as the lex specialis, requiring that 
applicable human rights law be interpreted in conformity with the more permissive IHL 
standards.
118
 The present author is sceptical of these views. First, it is important to note that 
the ICJ’s invocation of the lex specialis maxim is a simple acknowledgment that the adoption 
of detailed treaty rules on a particular subject might be one relevant factor indicating the 
common intentions of the States parties when seeking to interpret another, ‘open’ treaty 
provision. The lex specialis maxim does not answer finally which rule prevails; rather, it 
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reminds us of one potential reference point when interpreting treaty provisions in order to 
help discern the intentions of the States parties.
119
 Other (equally relevant) factors may exist 
that undermine the claim that human rights standards are affected by applicable rules of IHL. 
One cannot invoke the lex specialis maxim without, therefore, considering what weight such 
‘special’ rules should have in the interpretive process and why.120  
 Second, the existence of incompatible treaty or customary obligations is not unusual in 
international law, and reconciliation of such obligations rests principally with the State that 
has consented to them.
121
 Otherwise, to the extent that reconciliation through consistent 
interpretation is not possible, the obligations will often simply apply in parallel to the same 
facts. Indeed, this was the approach of the ICJ in the only contentious case in which it has 
addressed the relationship between IHL and IHRL, where the ICJ made no explicit reference 
to the lex specialis maxim and instead simply applied all relevant treaties, both IHL and 
IHRL, in parallel, finding violations of both regimes based on the same facts.
122
 The need for 
a workable legal framework is, of course, especially necessary in this area. However, for 
those human rights standards that are insufficiently ‘open’ to allow for interpretation 
consistent with IHL (ie the ICJ’s approach in the Nuclear Weapons opinion), States still 
enjoy the right to derogate under most general human rights treaties, and it is unclear why we 
should be looking elsewhere for a means to reconcile these diverging obligations.
123
  
 Based on the above, one should be sceptical of the assumption that more exhaustive 
regulation of non-international conflicts by IHL necessarily results in IHRL effectively being 
displaced.
124
 However, as noted above, it is clear that many make this assumption. Indeed, as 
will be shown in the following section, certain States have utilised the ICJ’s approach here 
for the purpose of arguing that their actions during armed conflict are subject not to the 
higher standards of IHRL but the lower standards of IHL. It is this risk that explains the 
approach of the first school of thought to the regulation of non-international armed conflict 
explored in this section, that is, that IHRL should be drawn on as a direct source of rules. 
This represents a significant change from the manner in which IHRL was invoked 
traditionally, as evidence of the expanding scope of international law, so as to encourage the 
application of the rules applicable in international conflicts to non-international conflicts. The 
proposals explored here rely on the continued preservation of (what remains of) IHL’s 
distinction, lest the more permissive standards of IHL be invoked as the lex specialis so as to 
displace inconsistent (more protective) IHRL standards.  
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 There is another side to this, however, which is represented by the second school of 
thought. This school starts from an entirely different premise to the one discussed here and 
seeks to apply IHL alone to govern non-international armed conflicts in order to exploit the 
permissive aspects of that body of law, which, so the argument goes, contains the more 
appropriate standards for regulating State action in such situations. Certain advocates of this 
approach nonetheless continue to support the distinction between international and non-
international armed conflicts in IHL.  
 
B. The humanitarian law approach 
The development of the second school of thought, which I term the ‘humanitarian law 
approach’, is in many ways a response to the human rights approach discussed above. In 
short, whereas the emphasis of the human rights approach lies in the desire to achieve the 
highest protection for victims of non-international armed conflicts, the humanitarian law 
approach considers IHRL to be an inappropriate regulatory framework in such situations. 
Thus, certain States and commentators have called for the exclusive regulation of non-
international conflicts by IHL, in order to exploit the more permissive aspects of that regime, 
which, so the argument goes, are more appropriate standards in such situations.
125
 
Importantly for our purposes, certain advocates of this second school of thought, as with the 
first, do not envisage the complete elimination of the distinction drawn in IHL between 
international and non-international conflicts. Instead, as will be shown in this section, they 
draw from the law of international armed conflict with regard to particular permissive rules, 
whilst leaving many of the protective rules applicable only in international conflicts. 
 A recent example of this approach can be seen in the practice of certain States in their 
military operations against transnational non-State armed groups, such as the post-9/11 
practice of the US against al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. This practice has raised questions 
about how to categorise and regulate such operations,
126
 creating something of a deadlock 
between those advocating a ‘law enforcement/IHRL’ paradigm,127 and those in favour of a 
‘war/IHL’ paradigm.128 These post-9/11 debates are, in fact, no more than a specific 
application of a much older debate regarding the relationship between IHL and IHRL. That 
traditional debate centred on claims that IHRL formed part of the law of peace and IHL the 
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law of war, maintaining the conceptual and practical separability of the two regimes.
129
 This 
general debate has since faded with the emerging consensus that IHRL prima facie continues 
to apply in situations of armed conflict, operating alongside IHL.
130
 The post-9/11 practice, 
however, seems to have resurrected the old debates in particular cases.  
 This practice relating to conflicts between States and transnational non-State groups is 
important for our purposes as certain States qualify these as independent non-international 
armed conflicts. This is the case, for example, with regard to the US’ view of its military 
operations against al-Qaeda, which both the judiciary and the government consider to 
constitute a global non-international armed conflict, given that it involves hostilities between 
a State and non-State armed group.
131
 Clauss Kreß has shown more generally how recent 
State practice supports the application of the law of non-international armed conflict in 
situations involving transnational non-State groups.
132
 This practice represents a significant 
change from the past, when it was common for States to reject the view that a particular 
situation had reached the level of a non-international armed conflict, in order to avoid being 
bound by the restrictions in common Article 3 and seen to be losing control over their 
domestic affairs.
133
 However, as David Kretzmer has cogently argued, in light of the 
development of IHRL and, more specifically, the emerging consensus that those rules 
continue to apply in armed conflict, States now have an interest in a situation being governed 
by the more permissive rules of IHL.
134
 As noted, given the ICJ’s view that, at least for 
certain rules, IHRL must be interpreted in accordance with IHL as the lex specialis, applying 
the latter could allow States to exploit its more permissive rules by arguing that they 
effectively displace the protections afforded by the stricter IHRL rules.
135
 Ironically, this is in 
part a consequence of the gradual elimination of the distinction between international and 
non-international conflicts, itself a result of the humanising influence of human rights law on 
IHL.
136
 Indeed, it was also noted above that the gradual extension of IHL to non-international 
armed conflicts has led some to argue that IHL now operates in many areas, such as targeting, 
as the lex specialis in such situations.
137
 On this view, the conduct of States in non-
international conflicts is to be judged according to the more permissive standards of IHL, 
rather than the default human rights standards. Whether one shares this view or not, it is clear 
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that States have an advantage in a particular situation being governed by IHL.
138
 In addition, 
the traditional concern of States that applying IHL in a non-international armed conflict 
reflected an acknowledgment that they no longer have control over their territory does not 
apply in the case of extra-territorial military operations. 
 This advantage for States in having their conduct in non-international armed conflicts 
regulated exclusively by IHL is augmented by the fact that certain of the protective rules of 
IHL, such as combatant immunity and prisoner of war (POW) status, remain inapplicable in 
non-international armed conflicts.
139
 Consequently, the government is able to treat non-State 
fighters as common criminals and prosecute them for their mere participation in hostilities.
140
 
There is, therefore, not only an incentive for States to advocate an ‘IHL model’ for the 
regulation of non-international armed conflicts, and to argue that the permissive aspects of 
that regime then become the governing standards, but there also remains a significant 
advantage for States in preserving the distinction between international and non-international 
conflicts with regard to many of the protective rules.  
 This tendency to differentiate between the permissive and protective aspects of IHL can 
be seen in US detention practices in the context of its conflict with al-Qaeda.
141
 Here, the US 
has referred to a general ‘law of war’ right to detain enemy fighters in any armed conflict for 
the duration of hostilities.
142
 It is true that the law of international armed conflict explicitly 
authorises the internment of both enemy forces as POWs for the duration of hostilities,
143
 as 
well as enemy civilians for so long as they pose such a threat to State security as to 
necessitate internment.
144
 This power of internment is intimately tied up with the relative 
statuses recognised by the law of international armed conflict.
145
 However, IHL applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts neither confers a legal basis to intern nor regulates 
internment as such; these matters are instead left to domestic law (and IHRL).
146
 Given this 
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absence of regulation in IHL, the US draws on what it sees as ‘principles’ of the law of 
international armed conflict governing internment and extends these to non-international 
armed conflicts.
147
 Importantly, however, this practice of analogising to the law of 
international armed conflict seems only to extend to the permissive rules of IHL; in 
particular, although the US argues that it may detain enemy fighters in its conflict with al-
Qaeda (which, it was noted above, is treated by the US as a non-international armed conflict) 
on the same basis as combatants in international armed conflicts, it does not suggest that such 
fighters might be entitled to the protections afforded to combatants and POWs.
148
  
 This approach, therefore, seeks the elimination of the distinction between international 
and non-international armed conflicts with regard only to the permissive rules of IHL (those 
granting to States certain powers which would not be permitted in peacetime), whilst 
preserving the distinction for the purpose of the protective rules (those that limit the power of 
States). Insofar as IHL applicable in international armed conflicts is concerned, such a 
development would profoundly alter the structure of that regime, which premises the 
applicability of its permissive rules and protective rules on status: either one is a combatant, 
and thus subject to internment as a POW and protected by the large number of rules 
governing POW treatment in GCIII, or one is a civilian, and can only be interned where 
GCIV applies and where the conditions found therein governing civilian internment are met; 
where one is so detainable under GCIV, one necessarily enjoys the protections afforded by 
that treaty.
149
 The right to detain under IHL thus flows from the initial fact that the relevant 
Convention, with its permissive and protective rules, applies to the individual in question. 
Drawing solely from the permissive rules applicable in international armed conflicts and 
applying these by analogy to non-international conflicts without the corresponding protective 
rules distorts this status-based structure and could result in false positives, given the absence 
of objectively identifiable ‘combatants’ who could be targeted and/or interned on the basis of 
their status alone.
150
  
 Importantly, extending the permissive rules of IHL to non-international conflicts 
without the corresponding protective rules is, in fact, precisely the opposite approach which 
historically has been taken in developing the law of non-international armed conflict. As 
Sandesh Sivakumaran notes, ‘the law of non-international armed conflict does not provide 
the parties to the conflict with a right to undertake certain actions. Rather, it prohibits certain 
actions and regulates other conduct should the parties choose to engage in particular 
endeavours’.151 Thus, whilst IHL applicable in non-international conflicts recognises, for 
example, that the parties to a conflict will intern and use lethal force, it does not provide a 
legal basis for such actions; rather, it merely accepts that they occur and, without prohibiting, 
seeks to regulate them.
152
 This is, of course, reflective of the nature of IHL as a legal regime, 
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which regulates all aspects of armed conflict without affecting its legality as a matter of the 
ius ad bellum.
153
 Any legal bases for particular actions, such as detention, in non-international 
armed conflicts must, therefore, come from another source, principally domestic law. Indeed, 
the reason for this is clear: given that IHL applies equally to all parties to a non-international 
armed conflict,
154
 were IHL to provide legal authority to detain in such situations, for 
example, that legal authority would (presumably) apply equally to non-State armed groups, a 
result which States have consistently refused to accept.
155
 The practice referred to above of 
drawing on permissive rules of IHL to the exclusion of protective rules is entirely at odds 
with the way in which the law of non-international armed conflict has, thus far, developed.   
 Before concluding, it must be noted that the approaches explored in this section are 
very closely related to the debate on the existence of a third category of persons in IHL, 
alongside those of combatant and civilian. It was the view of the Bush Administration that 
non-State fighters in its conflict with al-Qaeda constituted ‘unlawful/enemy combatants’, 
targetable and detainable on the same basis as combatants under the law of international 
armed conflict and yet not entitled to combatant or POW status.
156
 This view has been 
heavily criticised for both its legal and ethical shortcomings.
157
 Indeed, State practice, much 
of which has been in response to US detentions, similarly confirms the non-existence of this 
alleged third category.
158
 Thus, as Emily Crawford notes, ‘[g]iven the almost uniform 
resistance to US attempts to proclaim a “Geneva” status of “unlawful enemy combatant”, it is 
doubtful such a legal category exists.’159 Although the Obama Administration has rejected the 
designation ‘unlawful/enemy combatant’, it appears to remain the US’ approach to extend the 
permissive rules on detention in international armed conflicts to its conflict with al-Qaeda, 
whilst excluding the protective rules.
160
 
 
C. Conclusions on the two schools of thought 
The above sections have demonstrated how the development of IHRL has encouraged the 
emergence of two schools of thought on the law of non-international armed conflict. Section 
3A illustrated how those seeking the highest level of protection of victims of such conflicts 
no longer advocate eliminating the distinction in IHL between types of conflict but instead 
seek to apply the more protective rules of IHRL to govern particular conduct in these 
situations; indeed, these arguments rely on the preservation of what remains of the distinction 
between the two categories of armed conflict so as to avoid lex specialis-based arguments 
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leading to the more permissive IHL rules undermining otherwise applicable human rights 
standards. Section 3B then explored a second school of thought that has emerged in light of 
the application of IHRL to armed conflicts. This school takes the view that IHL is the more 
suitable body of law for regulating non-international conflicts. Moreover, whilst those in this 
school analogise to the rules applicable in international armed conflicts, section 3B focused 
on those that do so with regard only to the permissive rules of IHL, preserving the legal 
distinction between types of conflict for the purposes of certain protective rules. 
Notwithstanding the difference between these two schools of thought, both rely in part on the 
preservation of IHL’s distinction between international and non-international conflicts.  
 This recent influence of IHRL is clearly at odds with its influence discussed in section 
2, where it was shown that historically IHRL had encouraged the gradual elimination of the 
distinction in IHL. This changing influence of IHRL is explained by the context surrounding 
the various developments in the law of non-international armed conflict. Thus, as explained 
at the outset, classical international law concerned itself principally with inter-State relations, 
with internal matters, including civil wars, generally being excluded. This was reflected in the 
debates leading to the adoption of common Article 3, the latter provision transgressing this 
traditionally restricted focus of public international law. The emerging international human 
rights norms at this time, also reflecting the move beyond primarily inter-State matters, were 
too embryonic for any serious debate to be had on their applicability during armed conflict.
161
 
In consequence, the manner in which these developments in IHRL were invoked was 
generally limited to their use as evidence of the consolidation of intra-State structures of 
obligation into international law, thereby undermining the historical basis for the 
marginalisation of non-international conflicts in IHL. It followed that many of the rules 
applicable in international armed conflicts could then be extended to their non-international 
counterparts, thus reducing the effects of the distinction in IHL.  
 As IHRL developed, however, the context changed, with a consensus emerging that the 
human rights obligations of States continue to apply in situations of armed conflict, especially 
non-international conflicts. With this changing context, IHRL could now be invoked as a 
direct source of rules for the regulation of non-international armed conflicts, and their more 
protective nature meant that those that had long argued for the better protection of victims of 
internal conflicts could now call for the exclusive application of this body of rules. 
Importantly, to avoid claims that these higher standards of IHRL were displaced by IHL, the 
general distinction between categories of conflict had to be preserved. At the same time, 
however, the emerging consensus regarding the continued applicability of IHRL in times of 
armed conflict has led others to argue in favour of the exclusive regulation of non-
international conflicts by IHL as the lex specialis. Once again, many of those supporting this 
approach consider that IHL’s distinction between categories of conflict should be preserved 
with regard to certain protective rules, including those granting combatant and POW status. 
 
 IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Whilst most accounts of the distinction between international and non-international armed 
conflict focus on the consequences of the distinction, this article has approached the subject 
from a different angle, constructing a narrative of its evolution within the context of the 
emergence of IHRL. By examining the development over time of IHL’s distinction between 
categories of conflict, and considering its relationship to other developments in international 
law, it is hoped that this article has offered a richer understanding of this structural feature of 
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IHL. In so doing, it has been made clear that the evolution of the bifurcation of armed 
conflict by IHL is closely linked with those debates regarding the relationship between that 
body of law and IHRL.  
 It is also hoped that this article has contributed to an understanding of some of the 
recent debates regarding the development of the law of non-international armed conflict, 
enabling us to move forward in this area. It was noted that the two schools of thought 
explored in section III are, in reality, extremes on the spectrum of possibilities for how the 
law of non-international armed conflict might now develop. Many authors fall between the 
two, arguing for an approach that draws on principles of both IHL and IHRL.
162
 It is 
submitted that this is the correct approach to take, for any successful discussion of this issue 
must avoid the intractable IHRL/IHL-paradigm debate. Indeed, it was noted above that the 
default legal position under existing law (ie absent derogation and other possible means of 
reconciliation) must be that both IHL and IHRL obligations apply in parallel to the same 
facts; in order not to be in breach of any obligation, the State must then adhere to the more 
demanding standard (ie IHRL).
163
 The present author has argued elsewhere that this current 
state of the law of non-international armed conflict should not be replaced with a new IHL 
treaty but should instead be built upon, relying on IHRL as the default legal framework 
regulating State actions, with the possibility of derogation where that framework becomes 
inappropriate based on the exigencies of the situation; where derogation does take place, a 
specially-developed IHL regime for non-international armed conflicts would then help to 
define the minimum standards below which no conduct may fall.
164
 Such an IHL regime 
would also be necessary in order to address the lack of rules that would otherwise bind the 
non-State armed group party to the conflict. 
 In this sense, both IHL and IHRL have important roles to play in any future law of non-
international armed conflict. The artificial boundaries established by legal categories such as 
‘international armed conflict’, ‘non-international armed conflict’ and other ‘situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions’, should not be determinative of the applicable norms. 
Instead, the starting point might more usefully be conceived in terms of a consideration of 
how different situations (regardless of their legal characterisation) might be regulated 
according to the highest standard of individual protection possible, which will involve a 
combination of rules drawn from both IHL and IHRL.   
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